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I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the social sciences have made impressive strides in
understanding human rights. The law-and-social science interdisciplinary
revolution—combined with advances in data availability, research design, and
computational tools—have made rights an even more fruitful subject for
academic research. While much of this new research has taken place in the social
sciences, scholars in the humanities are increasingly studying rights as well. For
example, historians took less interest in human rights per se until after the events
of 9/11 and the ensuing wars in the Middle East, but many are now studying the
origins of rights institutions, such as treaties, constitutions, and informal norms.1
This concluding Article to the “Future of Human Rights Scholarship” special
issue outlines how political scientists could draw on developments in law and
insights from history to take up a set of thus-far under-explored questions. While
political science has made important advances in studying human rights, the
field’s focus has been rather narrow. The bulk of human rights scholarship—
especially recent empirical scholarship—has focused on respect for physical
integrity rights: government-imposed torture, extrajudicial killing, unjust
imprisonment, and other violations of bodily integrity.2
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1. See, e.g., LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2008); JAMES LOEFFLER,
ROOTED COSMOPOLITANS: JEWS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2018); SAMUEL
MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
2. See, e.g., COURTENAY R. CONRAD & EMILY HENCKEN RITTER, CONTENTIOUS COMPLIANCE:
DISSENT AND REPRESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming 2019); OONA
A. HATHAWAY, DO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES MAKE A DIFFERENCE? (2002); Courtenay R. Conrad
& Will H. Moore, What Stops the Torture?, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459 (2010); Courtenay R. Conrad & Emily
Hencken Ritter, Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law, 75
J. POL. 397 (2013); Christian Davenport & David A. Armstrong, II, Democracy and the Violation of
Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 538 (2004); Emilie M. Hafner
Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110
AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005); Daniel W. Hill Jr., Democracy and the Concept of Personal Integrity Rights, 78
J. POL. 822 (2016); Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial
Model to Address Selection Effects, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912 (2013); Yonatan Lupu, Legislative Veto
Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 578 (2015); Emily

185 BOOK PROOF - COPE CRABTREE LUPU - BEYOND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY (DO NOT DELETE)

186

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

11/27/2018 11:04 AM

[Vol. 81:185

This disproportionate interest in physical integrity rights mirrors
international and comparative political scholarship’s broad emphasis on conflict,
such as atrocities, civil wars, and other forms of political violence.3 These topics
have overshadowed the small but growing research on what political scientists
sometimes call “empowerment rights.”4 Empowerment rights prohibit nonviolent government repression such as censorship and surveillance,5 as well as
suppression of assembly and association, electoral, and religious rights.6 The
conflict- and violent-repression-related literatures have also dwarfed research on
“social rights”7—the positive obligations of government to provide access to
goods like healthcare, shelter, and education.
Looking first at empowerment rights, and then at social rights, this Article
argues that world developments over the last decade have made both rights
especially salient topics for social science research. Those interested in rights and
repression should dedicate some of their agendas to the protection and violation
of empowerment rights like voting, free speech, and association, and to why
governments succeed or fail in delivering social rights like healthcare, food,
welfare, and housing. This Article also explains why these questions are ripe for
academic inquiry and begins to sketch an outline for what those research agendas
might look like.

Hencken Ritter & Courtney R. Conrad, Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational
Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (2016); James Raymond
Vreeland, The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy, 52 J. CONFLICT RES. 401
(2008); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental
Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2013).
3. James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Explaining Interethnic Cooperation, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
715 (2014); Evgeny Finkel, The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance During the
Holocaust, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 339 (2015); Daniel W. Hill, Jr. & Zachary M. Jones, An Empirical
Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 661 (2014); Zachary M. Jones
& Yonatan Lupu, Is There More Violence in the Middle?, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 652 (2018).
4. Charles Crabtree & Michael J. Nelson, New Evidence for a Positive Relationship between De
Facto Judicial Independence and State Respect for Empowerment Rights, 61 INT’L STUD. Q. 210 (2017).
5. See Nicholas Dietrich & Charles Crabtree, Domestic Demand for Human Rights: Free Speech
and the Freedom–Security Trade-Off, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming); Gary King, Jennifer Pan, &
Margaret E. Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective
Expression, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2013); Charles Crabtree, Christopher J. Fariss & Holger L. Kern,
Truth Replaced by Silence: A Field Experiment on Private Censorship in Russia (Dec. 26, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2708274.
6. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Daniel W. Hill Jr., Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State
Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 (2010); Yonatan Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic
Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements, 67 INT’L ORG. 469 (2013); Yonatan
Lupu, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, The Strength of Weak Review: National Courts,
Interpretive Canons, and Human Rights Treaties, INT’L STUD. Q. (forthcoming) (on file with author);
Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights,
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2018 at 31.
7. Daniel M. Brinks, Varun Gauri & Kyle Shen, Social Rights Constitutionalism: Negotiating the
Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 289, 289-308 (2015); David
Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 189 (2012).
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II
PREVENTIVE REPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS
Though political science’s interest in physical integrity rights has produced
important findings and advanced our understanding of the causes and effects of
civil conflict and government repression, it has left other important questions
unanswered.8 For example, this focus has diverted attention from less violent
forms of repression, particularly restriction of empowerment rights like freespeech and the freedom of assembly and association.9 These forms of repression
are less visible and less violent. But evidence suggests they are increasingly
common.10 Indeed, recent research shows that violent human rights abuses in
general have decreased around the globe in the last 50 years.11 Some of this may
be due to shifting norms, changes in the human rights treaty regime, or other
trends. It could also be that governments have partially substituted non-violent
repression for violent repression. This Part explores this possibility and what it
means for future rights research.
When faced with potential opposition, governments willing to respond with
illiberal tactics have a repertoire of repression options from which to choose.
These choices range from non-violent tactics, such as closing down printing
presses or houses of worship, to violent ones, such as torture and disappearances.
All of these tactics are also subject to choices of scale: a government seeking to
suppress speech may raise the cost of postage, as in Belarus, shut down a small
number of newspapers, as in Russia, or cut off the country’s access to the Internet,
as in Turkey; a government that chooses violence may opt for targeted killings or
mass atrocities.
The option the government chooses depends on a range of factors too broad
to review here in full, so this Part focuses on the difference between reactive
repression and preventative repression. The most violent and most notorious
abuses of human rights tend to occur when governments repress reactively. These
are situations in which an organized group, such as a protest movement or an
armed insurgency, has already mobilized to challenge the state or otherwise
taken action against it. This type of challenge to the state can include anything
8. See Steven C. Poe, C. Neil Tate & Linda C. Keith, Repression of the Human Right to Personal
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 291
(2002); David L. Richards, Alyssa Webb & Chad Clay, Respect for Physical-Integrity Rights in the TwentyFirst Century: Evaluating Poe and Tate’s Model 20 Years Later, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 291 (2015).
9. Though they are dwarfed by conflict-oriented research, a few recent works have addressed
empowerment rights. See, e.g., CENSORED: DISTRACTION AND DIVERSION INSIDE CHINA’S GREAT
FIREWALL, MARGARET E. ROBERTS (2018); Charles Crabtree, Christopher J. Fariss & Holger L. Kern,
What Russian Private Media Censor: New Evidence from an Audit Study (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author); Gary King, Jennifer Phan & Margaret E. Roberts, Reverse-engineering Censorship in
China: Randomized Experimentation and Participant Observation, 345 SCI. 891 (2014).
10. Freedom in the World 2015, FREEDOM HOUSE (2015), https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.W3I-QP5KigQ [http://perma.cc/HL6Q-H2GF] (last visited Aug.
13, 2018).
11. Christopher J. Fariss, Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the
Changing Standard of Accountability, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014).
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from a violent attack against the government or civilians to non-violent protests.
The intent of repression in this context is often to demobilize, punish, and
neutralize the opposition. In some situations, states react to mobilized dissent by
arresting, torturing, or killing members of the dissenting group.12 In the most
extreme cases when challengers to the state are sufficiently mobilized, the state’s
only remaining practical options may be either stepping down from power or
inflicting mass human rights abuses.13
Distinct from reactive repression is the set of activities governments use to
repress preventively.14 As the name suggests, preventive repression is intended to
prevent challengers to the state from organizing and mobilizing in the first place.
In that sense, it occurs at an earlier stage in contentious politics. Preventive
repression includes a wide set of tactics such as censorship, harassment,
surveillance, and restrictions on the freedom of movement. Preventive repression
can also be violent; governments often arrest, torture, and kill suspected
challengers to the state before they mobilize. In a recent example of preventive
repression, the Chavez regime in Venezuela created a database that included
detailed information on all Venezuelan registered voters. Although the database
included a tremendous amount of information, the regime was able to distribute
copies to officials around the country on a single disc.15 The regime also
nationalized the country’s only Internet Service Provider.16
The distinction between reactive and preventive repression is crucial to future
rights research for at least three reasons. First, while both types of repression can
involve physical violence, preventive repression is often less violent. It is designed
to stop groups from organizing in the first place. To do so, the state might engage
in broad-scale but non-violent rights violations, such as tracking or even
preventing citizens’ information-sharing. As Dobson writes, “Rather than
forcibly arrest members of a human rights group, today’s most effective despots
deploy tax collectors or health inspectors to shut down dissident groups.”17 In
Ben Ali’s Tunisia, for example, the government created an agency that provided
Internet service but also facilitated preventive repression. All Internet traffic,
including web access and e-mail, went through the agency, making it relatively
easy for the government to monitor and censor traffic.18 Lukashenko similarly
12. Will H. Moore, The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion, 44 J.
CONFLICT RES. 107 (2000).
13. Tiberiu Dragu & Yonatan Lupu, Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the
Endgame, 51 COMP. POL. STUD. 1042 (2018).
14. Nathan Danneman & Emily Hencken Ritter, Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression,
58 J. CONFLICT RES. 254 (2013); Tiberiu Dragu & Adam Przeworski, Preventive Repression: Two Types
of Moral Hazard, AM. POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming), https://robobees.seas.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/
files/draguprzeworski2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/W5RW-542S].
15. WILLIAM J. DOBSON, THE DICTATOR’S LEARNING CURVE: INSIDE THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR
DEMOCRACY (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Ben Wagner, Push-Button-Autocracy in Tunisia: Analysing the Role of Internet Infrastructure,
Institutions and International Markets in Creating a Tunisian Censorship Regime, 36 TELECOMM. POL’Y
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controls Internet throughput in Belarus.19 To be sure, preventive repression can
be violent—a government may assault or even kill individuals to deter others
from taking up arms—but mass atrocities are generally the result of reactive, not
preventive, repression. Likewise, reactive repression does not have to be violent.
Faced with mass protests, governments sometimes respond with non-violent
actions such as curfews and barricades. Nonetheless, while non-violent means can
often prevent such situations from arising in the first place, these tactics are often
not sufficient deterrents once a movement has organized.
Second, all else equal, governments prefer to repress preventively than
reactively. This is because once dissent has mobilized, especially in the context of
mass protests, reactive repression is costly, risky, and potentially counterproductive.20 After a mass protest or insurgency has begun, the government’s
ability to retain power is at risk; the government would prefer not to reach this
phase in the process in the first place.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, advances in information and
communications technology have made, and will likely continue to make,
preventive repression less costly for governments to implement on a massive
scale.21 The Internet in particular facilitates the use of many tools that
governments use to prevent mass mobilization, including firewalls, content filters,
and sophisticated digital monitoring. The ability of governments today to control
and monitor the flow of information has no historical precedent. As Tufecki
writes:
Surveillance and repression, do not operate primarily in the way that our pre-digital
worries might have forecast. This is not necessarily Orwell’s 1984. Rather than a
complete totalitarianism based on fear and blocking of information the newer methods
include demonizing online mediums, and mobilizing armies of supporters or paid
employees who muddy the online waters with misinformation, information glut, doubt,
confusion, harassment, and distraction, making it hard for ordinary people to navigate
the networked public sphere, and sort facts from fiction, truth from hoaxes. Many
governments target dissidents by hacking and releasing their personal and private
information to try to embarrass or harass them, rather than acting directly on their
political communication.22

One way of thinking about preventive repression and reactive repression is
as policy substitutes. Governments often turn to reactive repression after
preventive repression fails. If technology allows governments to use preventive

484 (2012).
19. Charles Crabtree, Christopher J. Fariss & Paul J. Schuler, The Presidential Election in Belarus,
October 2015, 42 ELECTORAL STUD. 304 (2016).
20. See CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978).
21. See BRUCE J. DICKSON, THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S
STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL (2016); EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF
INTERNET FREEDOM (2012); Helen V. Milner, The Digital Divide: The Role of Political Institutions in
Technology Diffusion, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 176 (2006); Tiberiu Dragu & Yonatan Lupu, Does
Technology Undermine Authoritarian Governments? (Aug. 7, 2018), http://yonatanlupu.com/Technology
%20and%20Authoritarian%20Governments.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4UN-983W].
22. ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED
PROTEST xxviii (2017).
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repression more effectively, future societies may witness massive increases in
non-violent repression. If this repression prevents mobilized dissent, we should
also see decreases in violent repression. This is because if future governments can
use non-violent means to prevent protestors and insurgents from taking to the
streets, they may have less need to resort to violent repression. We may find
ourselves in a world where physical integrity rights appear better respected (or
at least violated less often) for reasons that are completely independent from
human rights norms and institutions. In fact, we may already be in that world.
What does this mean for the future of political science rights research? First,
it suggests scholars should increase their focus on non-violent repression. As a
field,23 human rights scholarship needs better theories of why and how
governments use non-violent repression, richer concepts of the types of nonviolent repression (especially those that new technology makes possible), and
more fine-grained data on the use of these tactics.24 Second, this raises the
possibility that the human rights legal regime has been (or soon may be) outpaced
by technology. Existing rules were conceived and created at a time when a given
set of rights violations seemed plausible. Today, governments can violate rights
in ways that activists, lawyers, and scholars in the 1960s may not have considered.
Some of the sophisticated ways governments have of conducting preventive
repression today may either not run afoul of the current rules or be too difficult
to detect on an individual basis to be legally actionable.25 To what extent has the
human rights regime become outdated? We cannot hope to answer this difficult
question in the short span of this essay, but we encourage scholars to consider it
in their future research.
III
GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
Though empowerment rights have been understudied in political science,
they have gotten far more attention than social rights. There are at least a dozen
studies of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (ICCPR)
impact on rights, but just a few empirical studies to date26 that have considered
the impact of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), the flagship social rights convention which was concluded over
23. This Article uses the word “field” to mean the set of disciplines—including law, political science,
history, and sociology—that study human rights.
24. There are an increasing number of datasets that include violations of physical integrity rights at
spatially and temporally disaggregated levels, but there are fewer similar datasets for empowerment
rights.
25. Morozov, supra note 21.
26. See, e.g., M. Rodwan Abouhard et al., Do Non–Human Rights Regimes Undermine the
Achievement of Economic and Social Rights?, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:
EMERGING POSSIBILITIES FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (LaDawn Haglund & Robin Stryker eds.,
2015); Wade M. Cole, Strong Walk and Cheap Talk: The Effect of the International Covenant of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on Policies and Practices, 92 SOC. FORCES 165–94 (2013); Emilie
Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty
Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005).
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50 years ago.27
Social rights, which are qualitatively different from civil and political rights,
are sometimes referred to as positive rights because they require the government
to take affirmative steps to uphold them. That is, while the prohibition of torture
requires governments to refrain from acting to make citizens worse off, i.e.,
harming them, the right to housing requires governments to act affirmatively to
benefit citizens.28
To be sure, countless political economy studies have measured how different
interventions affect wealth, literacy, housing, and health, but those studies are
often based on policies not rooted in either domestic or international rights. But
political science has not generally treated these interventions as rooted in law,
much less as entitlements derived from natural law, constitutions, or international
rules.
Why does the field typically ignore social rights? Political scientists’ lack of
attention might mirror the reason for the relative lack of interest in
empowerment rights. International relations scholars have taken up questions of
human rights treaty effectiveness because they are interested in government
repression and how to reduce it. As a result, the natural focus has been on rights
most closely related to repression, meaning physical integrity rights. This focus
has led them to largely ignore social rights.
The disproportionate focus on civil and political rights is curious from an
international law scholar’s perspective. After all, for legal scholars (especially
outside the United States), social rights are an important component of
international human rights law, enshrined in one of the two comprehensive
human rights conventions, the ICESCR. Social rights stand on equal footing with
civil and political rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and
they later took on binding status in the ICESCR, as Cold War divides prevented
states from agreeing on a single, global bill of binding rights. This divide persists

27. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. This distinction between positive and negative rights is not always so bright. Social rights
sometimes involve prohibitions on government action. For instance, the UN Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights states that the ICESCR includes the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill social
rights. Asbjørn Eide (Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food), The Right to Adequate Food as a Human
Right: Final Report submitted by Asbjørn Eide, ¶ 112-114, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987).
See also Aiofe Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-state Actors through the
Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the ‘Obligation to Protect,’ 9 HUMAN RIGHTS
L. REV. 225, 227 (2009). Of these three, only the obligation to fulfill entails an affirmatively duty. Comm.
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 105 (January 20, 2003). The
other two—respect and protect—include negative obligations. The obligation to protect means that
states cannot take measures that intervene with people’s enjoyment of rights, such as mass evictions from
subsidized or low-income housing. Some even argue that cutting funding levels of social welfare programs
violates social rights (a principle known as “non-retrogression”). Likewise, negative rights can sometimes
entail affirmative duties, as when they require the government to protect people from rights violations
by private citizens. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 6 (2004).
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to some extent; some countries with more libertarian traditions like the United
States and Australia have ratified only the ICCPR. Yet the great majority of
states are a party to both treaties, and the UN has declared social rights to be
“indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” with civil and political rights.29
For legal scholars, then, social rights enjoy equal status to civil and political rights.
And the topic of social rights is particularly important as human rights is
increasingly being criticized for ignoring questions of inequality.30
For example, legal historian Samuel Moyn has recently documented how the
human rights movement has comfortably coexisted with the neo-liberal project
of free trade, privatization, and globalization. But Moyn argues that it has done
relatively little to take up inequality by using and enforcing social rights. In both
of these fields, there is a growing sense that social rights have been overlooked.
Moyn claims that “organizations such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch … dropped the emphasis on economic and social rights proclaimed
by the UN’s Universal Declaration and converted the idea of human rights from
a template for citizenship into a warrant for shaming state oppressors…. The
political and legal project of human rights became a companion to the rise of
inequality, which paved the road to populism and further rights abuses.”31
While there is less political science research on the effect of social rights, there
is a robust body of legal research on social rights enforcement. This interest is not
just academic, and its timing is not coincidence. Domestic and regional courts
around the world, especially in Latin America, have increasingly enforced the
ICESCR or relied on the Committee’s interpretations in issuing their judgments.
This has led to a growing body of legal scholarship by Latin Americanists on
domestic and regional courts’ interpretations of social rights. Social rights are also
now enforceable at the international level. In 2013, an international enforcement
mechanism took effect that establishes an individual complaints procedure.32
And the Spanish Supreme Court recently ruled that the ICESCR’s
interpretations constitute binding domestic law in that country.33
Social rights, then, have become practically significant as international
institutions and in domestic law, particularly in the Global South. But, as
discussed above, there has still been little interest in the topic from political
scientists. There are at least two reasons why social rights are now ripe for further
study. First, political scientists are interested in treaty effectiveness, and the
29. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993).
30. MOYN, supra note 1.
31. Samuel Moyn, Human Rights Are Not Enough: We Must Also Embrace the Fight Against
Economic Inequality, THE NATION (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/human-rightsare-not-enough/ [http://perma.cc/D4X6-P45F].
32. But, like the interpretations of the HRC of the ICCPR, these are not legally binding. Laurence
R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE
L. J. 273 (1997).
33. Koldo Casla, Supreme Court of Spain: UN Treaty Body individual decisions are legally binding,
EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/supreme-court-of-spain-un-treaty-body-individualdecisions-are-legally-binding [http://perma.cc/MQ7Q-DU7D].
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ICESCR represents a potentially important treaty. The literature on treaty
effectiveness has been dominated by studies of treaties concerned primarily with
negative rights—the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the ICCPR, and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The studies reach
mixed results, but many find that the treaties exert a statistically significant but
substantively moderate positive effect, often conditional on the presence of
certain domestic political or legal institutions.34 But there is some evidence that
treaties’ effect is different for positive rights than for negative rights.35 If the
conclusions from the treaty-effectiveness literature are biased by oversampling
of negative-rights treaties, more focus on treaties like ICESCR and the positive
rights in CEDAW, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
would help to correct that bias.
Second, political scientists are interested in the spread of national populism
around the world. Some evidence suggests that income inequality has largely
fueled these movements. As Moyn claims, “Today’s galloping inequality has
helped drive the rise of populist leaders, who have hardly been friends of human
rights.”36 Indeed, populist parties are often successful in advocating for rollbacks
in empowerment rights. This means that by studying state provisions of social
rights, researchers can also better understand the causes of empowerment rights
violations.
It is not an issue of measurement. Indeed, one potential benefit of studying
socioeconomic rights is that these rights are often easy to operationalize. Since
the ICESCR is focused on governments’ dedicating resources towards social
rights, social spending measures offer a reasonable way to examine variation in
these rights. One recent empirical study uses data on government spending on
healthcare and education (as a percentage of GPD and as a percentage of total
government spending) to gauge the impact of social rights in constitutions.37
While spending does not guarantee full realization of social rights, it captures
government efforts to make progress on realizing these rights. Other plausible,
easily available indicators of social rights—literacy rates and mortality rates—
better capture actual realization.
Social rights measures may even have some advantages over empowerment
and physical integrity rights measures. Negative rights do not always have a clear
34. Kevin L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 VA.
J. INT’L L. 459, 473 tbl. 1 (2016) (finding that of the primary rights-treaty effectiveness studies, 25
concerned only negative rights, 1 concerned positive rights, and 11 concerned treaties with a mix of
rights).
35. E.g., Daniel W. Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J.
POL. 1161 (2010) (finding a statistically significant effect of the CEDAW on political rights, but no
statistically significant effect for economic or social rights).
36. Samuel Moyn, Human Rights Are Not Enough: We Must Also Embrace the Fight Against
Economic Inequality, THE NATION (Mar. 16, 2018), available at https://www.thenation.com/article/
human-rights-are-not-enough/ [http://perma.cc/Z78J-VPW7].
37. Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Rights without Resources: The Impact of Constitutional Social
Rights on Social Spending, 60 J.L. & ECON. 713 (2018).
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link between the right and the observable indicator. Proof of this lies in the
panoply of different indicators for some single underlying construct, such as
torture or democracy.38 Another potential benefit is that for many socioeconomic
rights it is relatively easy to collect data on the defined measure.39 In contrast,
data on negative rights like extrajudicial killings and torture is often considerably
more difficult to collect, as governments do not compile systematic records of
these abuses.40 Indeed, states have powerful legal, political, and financial
incentives to conceal violations of many rights.41 Many measures require timeand resource-intensive interpretation of detailed NGO and agency reports. So
lack of measures are not a serious barrier to empirical research on social rights.
In many cases, social rights data are publicly available in the World Bank
Indicators database.42 In other cases, this data can be collected from national and
subnational administrative records.43
There are some important caveats. Though data on socioeconomic rights is
easier to collect, researchers should understand that this data also might be
biased in important ways. Social expenditure data is collected and provided by
the state. We know, though, that decisions about the production and release of
state data are often politically informed. States have strategic incentives to
release biased statistics.44 In some cases, states might artificially inflate official
statistics, such as GDP and emigration, to limit regime opposition.45 In other
cases, states might artificially deflate official statistics, such as economic and
population numbers, to qualify for foreign aid or other types of international
assistance.46 Understanding whether these biases also influence official statistics
38. Kevin L. Cope, Charles Crabtree, & Christopher J. Fariss, Patterns of Disagreement in State
Repression Measures, POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3055947 [http://perma.cc/77R5-PDA2];
Kevin L. Cope & Charles Crabtree, Conceptualizing and Measuring Repression (forthcoming 2018).
39. The development of a more extensive set of subnational social rights indicators would be a
beneficial direction for future work.
40. Todd Landman, Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 906
(2004).
41. Laia Balcells & Christopher M. Sullivan, New Findings From Conflict Archives: An Introduction
And Methodological Framework, 55 J. PEACE RES. 137 (2018); Christopher M. Sullivan, Material Witness:
Source Selection Bias In Comparative Police Data, 28 COMP. POL. NEWSL. 74 (2018).
42. THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator [http://perma.cc/J9DB-9LLU] (last
visited Aug. 13, 2018).
43. See R. Douglas Hecock, Electoral Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education
Spending in Mexico, 1999-2004, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 950 (2006); Evelyne Huber, Thomas Mustillo & John
D. Stephens, Politics and Social Spending in Latin America, 70 J. POL. 420 (2008); Daniel Ziblatt, Why
Some Cities Provide More Public Goods than Others: A Subnational Comparison of the Provision of
Public Goods in German Cities in 1912, 43 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 273 (2008).
44. Jeremy L. Wallace, Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China, 46 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 11 (2016).
45. Id.; Andrei Yeliseyeu, Emigration and Diaspora Policies in Belarus (European University
Institute, 2014).
46. See Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (2000);
Tim Büthe, Solomon Major & André de Mello e Souza, The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian
Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid
Allocation, 66 INT’L ORG. 571 (2012).
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about social spending is an important area for future research.
IV
CONCLUSION
Scholars of history and politics have documented a shift in how authoritarians
operate. Increasingly, they take and keep power through nominally democratic
institutions. Though coups d’etat and brute violence dominate the history of
autocracies, today’s autocrats are more likely to seek office through (ostensibly)
democratic elections and, once in power, to retain it through subtler forms of
repression. But ironically, one part of the authoritarian strategy is to promise—
and sometimes to successfully deliver—more social rights: in the form of welfare,
housing, and healthcare. Notably, nationalist leaders often succeed by promising
these benefits to some groups—natives, and religious or ethnic majority groups—
and denying them to others—migrants, and religious or ethnic minority groups.
A study of regimes focused narrowly on torture, disappearances, and
extrajudicial killings would therefore miss much of the story behind many
modern autocracies.
This story shows why political scientists might wish to look beyond physical
integrity rights and consider a broader range of civil, political rights, and social
rights. These rights represent the future of global law and politics, and—we
hope—of social science rights research.

